Programme

Unifying question

How does the property of "being justified" behave in artefacts produced by systems without causal coupling to reasons—synchronically and across time?

Lineage

The programme stands in the lineage of Peirce's fallibilism—the doctrine that no knowledge claim is immune to revision. It differs in where fallibility resides: for Peirce it is a condition of inquirers, whose beliefs are revised through ongoing, self-correcting inquiry; here it is a structural condition of systems that produce epistemic-looking artefacts without causal coupling to reasons—and hence without beliefs to revise.

It likewise draws on Rescher's methodological pragmatism—justification attaches primarily to methods, validated by their systematic success, and only derivatively to what they produce. It differs in where the warrant-carrying method can sit: for Rescher it belongs to the inquiring agent's own practice; here the producing system optimises for plausibility without causal coupling to reasons, so the method that confers warrant is relocated to the external verification practice around the generator—its track record calibrates reliance, but does not by itself justify what it produces.

Existing papers